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FOLLOWING GAME TRAILS: IDENTIFYING
THE RIGHT PATH TO RESTITUTION FOR
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE LACEY ACT
Ethan Arthur*
"There were innumerable game trails leading hither and thither, and,
after the fashion of game trials, usually fading out after a few
hundred yards. But there were certain trails which did not fade out.
These were the ones which led to water. One such we followed."
-Theodore Roosevelt'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Lacey Act, it is a federal crime to poach wildlife in violation of state
or foreign law and transport the wildlife across state or international borders.2
Conspiring to violate the Lacey Act also constitutes a violation of federal law,'
conviction for which subjects the perpetrator to paying restitution to his or her
victim.' Circuit courts have consistently found that the nation or state from
which the wildlife was unlawfully taken is the victim of the conspiracy to violate
the Lacey Act and is thus entitled to restitution.5 However, to use an analogy

* Ethan Arthur is an attorney in Florida. I am grateful to Lance N. Long, Professor of Legal
Skills at Stetson University of Law for his invaluable guidance and advice. I thank Sunai Edwards,
Kevin Lonzo, Darnesha Carter, Edward "Trey" Nazzaro, and Eri Andriola for their comments and
feedback. I also thank my wife, Alexandra, for her patience and support.
I THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AFRICAN GAME TRAILS: AN AcCOUNT OF THE AFRICAN WANDERINGS
OF AN AMERICAN HUNTER-NATURALIST 356 (Syndicate Publishing Co. 1910).
2

See infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text (summarizing the Lacey Act).

3 See infa notes 42-53 and accompanying text (discussing conspiracy and the Lacey Act).

See infa notes 54-80 and accompanying text (describing various victim restitution statutes).
See infa note 157 and accompanying text (highlighting cases in which states were found to

be victims of conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act).
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with which President Theodore Roosevelt would have been familiar, the circuits
have followed different game trails to the same water source. In other words,
the circuits are split regarding why states are entitled to restitution; specifically,
the circuits identify different state interests that are damaged by the Lacey Act
conspiracy. The Second and Fourth Circuits granted restitution for harm to a
foreign nations' and States' interests, respectively, in lost revenue, which they
6
acquired only after the wildlife had been poached. The Tenth Circuit ordered
restitution by equating sovereign ownership with a proprietary interest in
living wildlife.! The Sixth Circuit ruled on this issue, but its rationale was
unclear and categorizing it is difficult, however, it is most likely consistent with
the Tenth Circuit.'
Part II of this Article discusses the Lacey Act and conspiracy to violate it.'
10
Part III highlights some important victim restitution statutes. Part IV outlines
the distinct concepts of property and ownership used by courts in restitution
decisions." Part V discuses cases involving restitution for conspiracy to violate the
12
Lacey Act and the split that has formed in the circuits. In Part V, I argue that there
are two trails that circuits follow to restitution for victims of conspiracy to violate
3
the Lacey Act but, like the intrepid Roosevelt, courts must follow only one.1
The right trail to restitution in these cases was forged by the Second and Fourth
Circuits." Courts should follow the Second and Fourth Circuits because these
decisions are grounded in Supreme Court authority, comport with the principles
of sovereign ownership, and more efficiently meet the statutory requirements of
an oft-utilized restitution statute.

II. THE

LACEY

ACT

Known as the United States' "oldest wildlife conservation statute,"" the
7
Lacey Act' 6 was introduced in 1900 by Representative John Lacey.1 Prior to the

' United States v. Oceanpro Industries Ltd., 674 E3d 323 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Bengis, 631 E3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2011).
7

United States v. Butler, 694 E3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2012).

' United States v. Bruce, 437 E App'x 357 (6th Cir. 2011).
9 See infra notes 15-53 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 54- 80 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 81-156 and accompanying text.
2

See infra notes 157-249 and accompanying text.

13

Id.

14

Id.

1

Victor

J.

Rocco, Wildlife Conservation Under the Lacey Act: International Cooperation or

Legal Imperialism?, 80 MAY N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 11 n.1 (2008).
16

16 U.S.C. %§ 3371-3378 (2012).

" Rocco, supra note 15, at 12 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 56-474, at 1-2 (1900)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss1/3

2

Arthur: Following Game Trails: Identifying the Right Path to Restitution

2017

FOLLOWING GAME TRAILS

119

passage of the Lacey Act, a scofflaw could poach wildlife in one state and travel
to another state to sell it."8 This would render the perpetrator virtually immune
from prosecution because each state would lack jurisdiction to bring a case.' 9
The Lacey Act supplemented the states' laws that proved ineffective in protecting
wildlife by authorizing the federal government to prosecute those circumventing
the jurisdiction of the several states.20
While the Lacey Act was created as a failsafe to supplement deficiencies in
state law, today it stands out as the primary statute under which crimes against
wildlife are prosecuted. 2 When appropriate, charging a defendant with conspiracy
adds strength to the prosecution of wildlife crimes.22

A. A Brief Overview of the Lacey Act
The Lacey Act outlaws two types of actions associated with illicit trade in
wildlife:2 3 trafficking violations 2 4 and paperwork violations.2 5Trafficking violations
occur when wildlife "has been illegally taken, possessed, transported, or sold." 2 6
Paperwork violations include circumstances in which a person has failed to mark
game or falsified shipping documents. 27 The term "wildlife" is defined broadly,
"encompass [ing] virtually all wild animals," and any parts thereof 28
18 Id.
19 Id.
20

Id.

See Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America's Premier Weapon in the Fight Against
Unlawful Wildihfe Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 27, 29 (1995).
22 See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying
text.
21

23 Anderson, supra note 21, at 53.

See 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2012) (defining trafficking offenses as "[o]ffenses other than
marking offenses"); Anderson, supra note 21, at 53.
24

25 Although neither the Lacey Act nor Anderson use the term "paperwork offenses," this
Article utilizes the phrase to avoid confusion. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372(b), (d).
26 Eg., United States v. Kaba, 495 F. App'x 197, 199 (2d Cit. 2012)
(unpublished) (upholding

a Lacey Act conviction for smuggling and selling elephant ivory); United States v. Santillan, 243 E3d
1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the government presented sufficient evidence to support
the Lacey Act conviction for illicitly transporting live parrots into the United States); Anderson,
supra note 21, at 57-58 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)).
27 Eg., United States v. Kapp, 419 E3d 666, 676 (7th Cit. 2005)
(upholding a Lacey Act
conviction for knowingly creating false records for animals, and parts thereof, protected by the
Endangered Species Act); United States v. Allemand, 34 F3d 923, 926 (10th Cit. 1994) (affirming
conviction of defendants who included false information on an export declaration when shipping
animal hides from Canada); Anderson, supra note 21, at 53 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3372(b), (d)).
28 Anderson, supra note 21, at 54 ("The term 'fish or
wildlife' means 'any wild animal,
whether alive or dead, including without limitation any wild mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian,
fish, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod, coelenterate, or other invertebrate, whether or not bred,
hatched, or born in captivity, and includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof' (quoting 16

U.S.C. § 3371(a))).
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Trafficking Violations

A successful trafficking prosecution requires proving two separate violations
of law: a predicate violation and an overlying violation. 29 Each prong is distinct
and must be established with separate acts.30 First, the government must establish
the predicate violation.3 ' Proving the predicate violation means showing that
the wildlife had been "taken, possessed, transported, or sold" in violation of any
federal, state, or foreign law.32 The law in question must have been enacted for the
purpose of protecting wildlife.3 3 Also, the predicate violation law does not need to
be "prosecutable;" just a violation of law or regulation is required.3 4 Additionally,
the government must prove the overlying violation.35 To prove the overlying
violation, the government must establish that the defendant has "imported,
exported, transported, [sold], received, acquired, or purchased" wildlife in a
fashion proscribed by the Lacey Act.3 6

Anderson, supra note 21, at 58.
Id. at 59-60 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 933 E2d 748, 750 (9th Cit. 1991)). The
Lacey Act also outlines specific civil and criminal penalties, with corresponding levels of mental
culpability. 16 U.S.C. § 3373. However, that analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
31 Anderson, supra note 21, at 59. The government does not necessarily need to show that the
29
30

predicate crime occurred before the overlying crime. Id. at 60 (citing United States v. Sylvester, 605
E2d 474, 475 (9th Cir. 1979)).
32 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (including "any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States or ...
any Indian tribal law . .. [or] any law or regulation of any State or . .. any foreign law").
" Anderson, supra note 21, at 74-75.
34 See, e.g., United States v. McNab, 331 E3d 1228, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a Honduran law which was violated by the defendant but subsequently overturned was a sufficient
predicate crime because the law was valid when the defendant violated it); United States v. Borden,
10 E3d 1058, 1062 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the state law predicate was sufficient despite
the fact the statute of limitations for prosecution had run).

.

35 Anderson, supra note 21, at 58. When the predicate violation is an infraction of state or
foreign law, the overlaying or "Lacey Act violation must involve interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)).
36 Id. at 59. "[I]n most cases, this second step must have involved a sale or purchase." Id.
at 59 n.223. Anderson describes this prong as "prohibiting trade in 'tainted wildlife."' Id. at 57
(noting, however, that the word "tainted" is not found in the Lacey Act). The Lacey Act defines
"sale" of wildlife to include situations in which "a person for money or other consideration . .
offer[s] or provide[s] . . . guiding, outfitting, or other services; or ... a hunting or fishing license or
permit; . . .for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or possessing of fish or wildlife."
16 U.S.C. § 3372(c). Similarly, "purchase" of wildlife includes "obtain[ing] for money or other
consideration ... guiding, outfitting, or other services; or . .. a hunting or fishing license or permit;
for the illegal taking, acquiring, receiving, transporting, or possessing of fight or wildlife." Id.
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2. Paperwork Violations
Paperwork violations deal with documents associated with transporting
wildlife and can be broken down into two separate crimes: false labeling offenseS3 7
and marking offenses.38 The Lacey Act's false labeling provision addresses wildlife
that "has been, or is intended to be .

.

. imported, exported, transported, sold,

purchased, or received from any foreign country; or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce." 9 Specifically, "[i]t is unlawful for any person to make or
submit any false record, account, or label for, or any false identification of" such
wildlife.40 The Lacey Act's marking offense provision makes it "unlawful for any
person to import, export, or transport in interstate commerce any container or
package containing any .. . wildlife unless the container or package has previously
been plainly marked, labeled, or tagged in accordance" with federal law.4 1

B. Conspiracyand the Lacey Act
In addition to prosecuting Lacey Act violations, federal prosecutors can bring
a case for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act, when warranted. 42 The crime of
conspiracy is committed when "two or more persons conspire either to commit
any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy." 43 The independent crime of
conspiracy requires proving an overt act and the requisite mental state.4 4 Upon
conviction, each conspirator faces up to five years imprisonment.
Prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act requires establishing
the elements of conspiracy as well as elements of the Lacey Act.4 1 Conspiracy

3

3
3

16 U.S.C. § 3372(d).
Id. § 3372(b).
Id. § 3372(d).

40

Id.

4'

Id. § 3372(b).

42 Anderson, supra note 21, at 36.

4 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
44 Christine Fisher, Comment, Conspiring to Violate the Lacey Act, 32 ENvL. L. 475,
500 (2002).

15

18 U.S.C. § 371.

46 Fisher, supra note 44, at 499 ("The charge of conspiracy to illegally traffic wildlife
combines section 3372(a) of the Lacey Act with the federal conspiracy statute."). As the scope of
this Article is confined to post-conviction restitution, further discussion of the requirements of
prosecution is unnecessary.
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is an important tool in prosecuting wildlife crimes.4 7 Prosecuting a defendant
49
for conspiracy has both evidentiary advantages" and sentencing advantages.
Moreover, and central for the purposes of this Article, conspiracy is a crime
codified in Title 18 of the United States Code,o while the Lacey Act is enshrined
in Title 16.1 As discussed below, some restitution statutes apply only to Title 18
52
offenses and are therefore not applicable for violations of the Lacey Act alone.
Upon conviction for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act, a defendant is subject to
restitution under statutes limited to Title 18 offenses. 53
The Lacey Act has proven to be the preeminent statute in the fight against
wildlife trafficking. While it has been on the books for over a hundred years,
it is still used to prosecute those who engage in wildlife crime. Including the
charge of conspiracy adds muscle to the prosecution and, as a Title 18 offense, has
the additional advantage of empowering courts to order victim restitution under
certain statutes.

III. VICTIM

RESTITUTION STATUTES: THE VICTIM AND WITNESS

PROTECTION ACT AND THE MANDATORY VICTIM RESTITUTION

ACT

Victims' restitution is a way to make victims of crime whole from the loss
4
they suffered because of another's unlawful action. Once a defendant has
been convicted of a federal crime, the government may move for a court order
directing the offender to compensate victims for the damage caused by his or her

1d. at 477.
Id. at 501-05 (including the ability to try defendants together; allowing statements that
would otherwise be considered hearsay into trial as evidence against co-conspirators; and that the
government must merely prove an agreement and an overt act to gain a conviction for conspiracy
47

48

(citations omitted)).
" Id. at 505-07 (including sentencing for two separate federal crimes as well as potentially
harsher sentences from district court judges who may view the crime of conspiracy in a different
light than "merely" a Lacey Act violation (citations omitted)).
5

18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).

1' 16 U.S.C. %§ 3371-3378 (2012).
52 See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text (discussing restitution statutes' limited scope).
5 See Marcus A. Asner & Gillian L. Thompson, Restitution from the Victim's PerspectiveRecent Developments andFuture Trends, 26 FED. SENT'G. REP. 59, 60 (2013) ("That means a federal
conspiracy charge may well lead to a court ordering restitution 'even when it could not be awarded
for the underlying predicates."' (quoting United States v. Cummings, 189 E Supp. 2d 67, 73
(S.D.N.Y 2002))).

54 Eg., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cit. 2004).
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criminal conduct." However, federal courts require statutory authority to order
victim restitution.5 6
Victims' restitution statutes were enacted in response to a push for victims'
rights which began in the 1970s.5 7 Crime victims felt that the courts put greater
emphasis on protecting the rights of criminals than protecting the crime victims'
interests.5 1 In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, recognizing the need for expanded
rights for crime victims, created the Task Force on Victims of Crime. 9 Motivated
to address issues highlighted by the victims' rights movement,60 Congress passed
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 6" the nation's first
federal statute dedicated to victims' rights. 62 Over a decade later, Congress further
exhibited its commitment to victims' issues by enacting the Mandatory Victim
Restitution Act (MVRA).63
The VWPA and the MVRA have elements in common. Both the VWPA and
MVRA only allow restitution for injury caused by a Title 18 offense.6 1 Also, each
statute defines victim as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of
the commission of an offense."6 5 Courts have broadly interpreted the term person
to include federal, state, and local governments, their agencies,66 as well as foreign

Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2012). The CVRA charges the
5
court with ensuring that victims are afforded the rights enumerated within the CVRA, including
the "right to full and timely restitution as provided by law." Id. § 3771 (a)(6), (b)(1). The CVRA also
allows "the attorney for the Government [to] assert the" victims' rights. Id. § 3771(d) (1).
56 Eg., United States v. Barton, 366 E3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Helmsley, 941 E2d 71, 101 (2d Cit. 1991).
17 David E. Aaronson, New Rights andRemedies: The FederalCrime Victims' RightsAct of2004,
28 PACE L. Rrv. 623, 626 (2008).
5
Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims in the Federal Rules of
CriminalProcedure, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 861, 865 (2007).

59

Id.

60

Kenneth B. Meyer, Note, Restitution and the Lacey Act: New Solutions, Old Remedies, 93

CORNELL L. REV. 849, 857 (2002).
6'

18 U.S.C. %§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (2012).

62

Cassell, supra note 58, at 866.

63

18 U.S.C. §§ 3613A, 3663A (2012).

' Id. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A), 3663A(c)(1)(A). Restitution has been ordered for victims of crimes
which span the entire spectrum of Title 18 offenses. See, e.g., United States vs. Salas-Fernmndez, 620
F.3d 45, 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2010) (armed robbery of a bank truck); United States vs. Simmonds, 235
E3d 826, 828, 831 (3d Cit. 2000) (arson); United States vs. Amato, 540 E3d 153, 158, 162-63
(2d Cir. 2008) (mail and wire fraud).
6 18 U.S.C. %§ 3663A(a)(2), 3663(a)(2) (2012).
66 E.g., United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cit. 1994).
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nations. 7 The VWPA and MVRA also specify that when the "offense ... involves
as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, [victim status
is extended to] any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in
the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. "68

"

Despite the uniform elements, the statutes are not identical. As its name
indicates, the MVRA makes restitution mandatory in certain circumstances."
Courts must order restitution when sentencing a defendant who is guilty of an
offence that meets two requirements: First, the offense must fall under a category
listed in section 3663A(c)(1)(A), including an offense against property under
Title 18.70 Under this category, courts may need to establish that the victim is the
owner of the property." Second, the offense must be one "in which an identifiable
victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss." 7 2 When ordering
restitution for property damage, courts must require the defendant to "return
the property to the owner." 7 If, however, returning the property is "impossible,
impracticable, or inadequate" courts must order the defendant to pay "the greater
of the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or the
value of the property on the date of sentencing.

67

61
69

E.g., United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2011).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(2), 3663(a)(2).
Id. § 3663A(a)(1) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a
. . the court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the
(emphasis added)).

defendant .
offense .....

70 Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (offenses against property include those "committed by fraud or
deceit"). This Article discusses what constitutes property for the purposes of the MVRA in more
depth below.
7' Bengis, 631 F.3d at 39 ("[T]he threshold question is whether [the potential victim] has
a property interest in the [damaged property]."). Courts seem to use the terms "property" and
"proprietary" interchangeably when referring to a victim's interest in the damaged property. See

generally United States v. Oceanpro Indus. Ltd., 674 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2012); Bengis, 631 E3d at
39. This Article uses the terms interchangeably in this context. Compare ProprietaryInterest, BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "proprietary interest" as "[a] property right; specif., the
interest held by a property owner together with all appurtenant rights"), with Property, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "property" as "[t]he right to possess, use, and the right to
transfer); the right of ownership . . . [a]lso termed bundle of rights") and Proprietary, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "proprietary" as "[o]f, relating to, or holding as property").
72 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B). The MVRA does not require that a court grant
restitution
if the court finds that "the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution
impracticable." Id § 3663A(c)(3). Also, if the court decides that "determining complex issues of fact
related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong sentencing" such
that "the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing
process" the court need not order restitution. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Farrell, 115 E Supp. 3d
746, 757 (S.D. Va. 2015). These circumstances are outside the scope of this Article.
7

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1).

Id. The VWPA has similar language, however while courts may grant restitution under both
statutes, ordering restitution pursuant to either statute, individually, is sufficient. Eg., Oceanpro,
71

674 E3d at 331; Bengis, 631 E3d at 40.
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Unlike the MVRA, the VWPA leaves restitution to the discretion of
the district court.75 The VWPA's scope has been described as a "broad" one that
merely requires "the victim to have some interest that was harmed." 7' To warrant
VWPA restitution, the victim need not have suffered harm to a proprietary
interest.77 Nor is there a requirement that the victim suffer pecuniary loss."
Despite their differences, courts often grant restitution pursuant to both the
VWPA and the MVRA. However, using both statutes does not affect the amount
of restitution that a victim recovers.7 1 While courts can predicate their orders of
restitution on multiple statutes in the same case, the criteria for each statute must
be met in those circumstances.so

IV.

DIFFERENT TRAILS MADE

ILLUSTRATING

BY

DIFFERENT BEASTS:

DISTINCT CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY AND OWNERSHIP

The related concepts of property and ownership play an important role in
determining whether a crime victim is entitled to restitution. Whether property
was damaged by criminal activity, and the level of interest held by the victim in
that property, can effect which statute a court may use to grant restitution. As
will be discussed below, courts have followed two trails to victim restitution for
conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act, each based on distinct concepts of property
and ownership. This Part will focus on illuminating the origins of the separate
lines of precedent. Section A will discuss a line of cases in which the Supreme
Court determined what is, and what is not, property for the purpose of federal
criminal statutes. Section B will discuss the concept of state sovereign ownership

of wildlife.

7 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (stating "[t]he court, when sentencing a defendant ...
may
order .. . that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense" (emphasis added)).
76 Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331 (internal quotations omitted); see also Anser & Thompson,

supra note 53, at 60 ("[T]he VWPA is broader [than the MVRA]-in theory at least-because it
technically authorizes restitution in any Title 18 case.").
n Oceanpro,674 F.3d at 331 (finding that harm to a "legitimate and substantial interest" was
sufficient for VWPA restitution).
78 See 18 U.S.C. %§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (2012).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Donaghy, 570 E Supp. 2d 411, 424 (E.D.N.Y 2008) aff'n
both [VWPA
sub nom. United States v. Battista, 575 E3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009) ("Pursuant to ...
and MVRA] restitution statutes, the Court may award restitution, in the cases of an offense
against property, in the amount of the victim's loss."); United States v. Reifier, 446 E3d 65,
118-120 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing that restitution under both statutes does not violate Sixth
Amendment provision)
8o

Oceanpro, 674 F.3d at 330-32.
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A. Property, Predicate, and Prosecution ofFederal Crimes:
Cleveland and Pasquantino
In two cases involving statutory predicates to criminal prosecution, the Supreme
Court distinguished a state's regulatory interest from a state's property interest.
1.

Cleveland v. United States

In Cleveland v. United States, the Court was faced with whether unissued
licenses constituted state property within the meaning of the federal mail
fraud statute." The defendant made misrepresentations on an application and
subsequent renewal applications to obtain a Louisiana state license to operate
video poker machines.8 2 After uncovering evidence that the defendant had bribed
state lawmakers, the U.S. Government (the Government) charged the defendant
with money laundering, racketeering, and conspiracy.8 3 To successfully prosecute
the defendant for money laundering and racketeering, the Government had to
establish that the defendant committed the predicate offense of mail fraud." To
prove mail fraud, the Government had to show that the defendant (1) used the
mail; (2) to obtain "money or property"; (3) "by means of false or fraudulent
5
pretenses, representations, or promises." The Government met the first and
third elements, asserting that the defendant used the mail to send a licensing
application on which he made misrepresentations. To meet the second prong,
the Government argued that the defendant mailed the application to increase his
chances of getting a state license, and the license was property for the purposes of
the mail fraud statute. 7 The district court agreed and the defendant was convicted
of mail fraud, money laundering, and racketeering." The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 9
On appeal, the Government argued that the licenses were property of the
State because the State received money from fees relating to the licenses and a
percentage of the "revenue from each video poker device." 0 The Supreme Court
"8 Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15, 17-18 (2000).
82 Id. at 15-16.
1

Id. at 16 (charging a co-defendant as well).

Id. at 25 ("[M]ail fraud is a predicate offense under RICO and the money laundering
statute." (citations omitted)).
84

85

Id. at 16 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341).

8 Id. at 17. "To qualify for a license, an application must meet suitability requirements
designed to ensure that licensees have good character and fiscal integrity." Id. at 15.
8 Id. at 17-18. As noted in Cleveland, the Court had previously held that the mail fraud
statute at issue is limited to protecting property rights. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
25 (1987); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).

" Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 18.
89 Id.
9o

Id. at 21-22.
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was unpersuaded and unanimously held that unissued licenses were not property
of the State." The Court reasoned that the State's video poker licensing scheme
was "a typical regulatory program" in which the State "licenses, subject to certain
conditions, engagement in pursuits that private actors may not undertake without
official authorization. 9 2 The Court noted that the State "received the lion's share
of its expected revenue not while the licenses remain in its own hands, but only
after they have been issued to licensees." 93 Prior to issuance, the licenses generate
no "ongoing stream of revenue": they "merely entitled the State to collect a
processing fee from applicants of new licenses."9 4 Indeed, the Government did
not assert that the defendant "defrauded the State of any money to which the
State was entitled by law."" In fact, there was no dispute that the defendant paid
Louisiana all money that it was lawfully due.9 6 The Court concluded that the mail
fraud statute "requires the object of the fraud to be 'property' in the victim's hands
and that a Louisiana video poker license in the State's hands is not 'property'
under [that statute]."9
2.

Pasquantino v. United States

Five years later, the Supreme Court distinguished Cleveland in Pasquantino
v. United States." In Pasquantino, the Court had to decide whether Canada's
right to receive tax revenue was property within the meaning of the federal
wire fraud statute.99 The defendants were convicted of wire fraud for ordering
liquor from another state via telephone and unlawfully smuggling the liquor
00
into Canada without paying the requisite excise taxes.' The federal "wire fraud
statute prohibits the use of interstate wires to effect any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.'1 Defendants argued, in pertinent
part, that the "object of [their alleged] fraud [was not] money or property in the

victim's hands."1 02

91 Id. at 27.

Id. at 21. The Court continued, "In this regard, it resembles other licensing schemes
characterized by this Court as exercises of state police power" such as licenses to "transport alcoholic
beverages," "sell corporate stock," "sell liquor" or operate a ferry. Id. (citations omitted).
92

93 Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
94

Id

95 Id
96

Id

97

Id. at 26-27.

9' Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005).
99

100
10
102

Id. at 353-55.
Id. at 353.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343).
Id at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 26).
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Unpersuaded by the defendants' argument, the Court found that "Canada's
right to uncollected excise taxes on the liquor [that the defendants] imported into
Canada [was] property in its hands."10 3 The Court reasoned that the right to be
paid money was a right to property. 0 4 If the defendants had properly imported
the liquor into Canada, they would have paid the Canadian government money
in the form of taxes.10 By smuggling the liquor into Canada, and thereby
evading their tax obligations, the defendants "deprived Canada of that money,
inflicting an economic injury no less than had they embezzled funds from the
Canadian treasury.""o'
In rendering its decision, the Court expressly distinguished Cleveland: unlike
the states' purely regulatory interest in determining who gets a license, "Canada's
entitlement to tax revenue is a straightforward 'economic' interest."1 07 Moreover,
in Cleveland there was no indication that defendants attempted to deprive the
State of money; to the contrary, it was undisputed that defendants paid the State
all money that it was due under the licenses. 0 s In Pasquantino, however, the
defendants aimed to deprive Canada of money to which it was legally due. 1
Thus, Cleveland was consistent with the Court's determination that entitlement
10
to tax revenue was "property" for the purposes of the wire fraud statute.o
In Cleveland and Pasquantino, the Supreme Court made clear distinctions
between regulatory and economic interests. Harming a state's regulatory interest
did not harm state property, but depriving a nation of money to which it was
lawfully entitled was an economic harm that constituted harm to state property.

B. State Sovereign Ownership of Wildhfe
The modern concept of sovereign ownership of wildlife is nearly as old as
the American republic, with roots dating back to ancient Rome."' The monarchs
of medieval England had control over the wildlife within their kingdom:112 they

Id
Id. at 356. The Court explained that unpaid taxes were property under the common
meaning of property and in the historical context. Id.
105 Id.
103

104

106

Id.

107

Id. at 357.

10'
109

Id. (citing Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 22 (2000)).
Id

110

Id.

". David S. Favre, WildlifeRights: The Ever-Widening Circle, 9 ENVTL. L. 241,244-45 (1979).
112 See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing
Life into the Public Trust in Wildlifr,
35 LAND & WATER L. REv. 23, 33-34 (2000) ("[T]he English common law disliked 'ownerless'
things. Therefore, the 'ownership' of public resources was placed in the king.").
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determined who could hunt wild game and who was precluded from doing so."I
The major systemic mechanism utilized by the crown for exerting control over
resources, including wildlife, was the feudal system." 4 Under the feudal system,
the sovereign divvied up his or her territory into multiple fiefdoms, which were
entrusted to a select few vassals."' The vassal, or lord, enjoyed nearly unfettered
control over the people, crops, and wildlife on the land; however, the lord's control
was subordinate to, and exercised at the discretion of the crown."' "Early English
common law did not distinguish between proprietary and sovereign powers, since
both were lodged in the Crown."1 ' 7 The combination of sovereign and proprietary
power was known as the "royal prerogative.""'
Eventually, however, the monarch's power began to wane."' English courts
started to distinguish sovereign ownership of wildlife, described as the crown's
obligation "to manage wildlife for the benefit of all the people of [the] kingdom
rather than his own individual interest," from proprietary ownership, described as
"belonging to individuals, including the king."1 20 These principles traversed the
Atlantic with English colonists.121

113 Favre, supra note 111, at 245; see Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust
in Wildlif, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1454 (2013) ("As head of the government, the king held the
sovereign power to regulate wildlife harvests.").

114 See MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLFE LAW
8 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that feudalism was constructed so that the crown could effectively maintain
control over the people). Monarchs utilized other methods to regulate their subjects' use of wildlife,
including establishing "royal forests" and bestowing hunting rights to a number of "royal grantees."

Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of
Capture and State Ownership ofWildlfe, 35 ENvTL. L. 673, 679 (2005).
"1 S.E. Thorne, English Feudalism and Estates in Land, 17 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 193, 196 (1959).
116 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 114, at 679; see Thorn, supra note 115, at 200 (explaining
that, in the feudal system, "all men were tenants except the king"). With a royal land grant came
hunting privileges. Favre, supra note 111, at 246. However, there were some "royal animals" that
only the monarch, or someone with the monarch's express permission, could hunt. Id. (highlighting
the whale as an example of wildlife designated a "royal animal").
117 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 113, at 1454.

11 Id
"9 Id. The decline in royal powers has been attributed "to transfers to landholders and the rise
of parliamentary authority." Id. at 1454-55.
120

Id. at 1454.

Elise C. Pautler, Comment, Defending Florida'sMarine Treasures:An Argument to Expand
the Public Trust Doctrine and Reinforce FloridasRole in Coral Reef Protection, 43 STETSON L. REV.
151, 171 (2013); see also Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 113, at 1455 ("By the American Revolution,
121

sovereignty and proprietorship were understood to be separate forms of power.").
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Hunting in the early United States was a means of survival for many.1 2 2 As the
wildlife began to dwindle, many states instituted laws that regulated hunting wild
game, 2 3 however, their authority to do so was not firmly established. 2' The laws
were challenged in court,1 25 but "several state courts upheld legislation to stop
overharvesting by looking to English law." 26 The courts utilized the principles
underlying royal prerogative to "[fashion] a uniquely American justification for
regulation: the state 'ownership' doctrine," 27 wherein the states gained sovereign
ownership of the non-proprietary aspects of what was once the crown's royal
prerogative.1 28 State sovereign ownership was established law by the end of the
nineteenth century.1 29
The Supreme Court discussed sovereign ownership in Geer v. Connecticut.'3 0
At issue in Geer was whether a Connecticut statute that prevented legally hunted
game from being transported to another state violated the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.' 3 ' The Court explained that the State's authority

122

Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 113, at 1456.

123

Id. at 1456-57.

124 Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The PioneerSpiritand the
Public Trust: The American
Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildhfe, 35 ENvTh. L. 673, 693 (2005) ("[State] power to
curb the rule of capture remained questionable.").
125 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 113, at 1457 ("Inevitably, some of those
convicted under
statutory restrictions on taking wild animals challenged states' right to oversee harvest.").
126 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note
124, at 693.
127 Id. (referring to this doctrine by an alternative description, "the
wildlife trust"); cf DALE
D. GOBLE & ERIc T FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAw, CASE AND MATERUALS 294 (2002) ("[T]he doctrine
of royal prerogative ownership of submerged lands thus was transformed in the transition from
monarchy to republic into the doctrine of state sovereign ownership in which the state held the
lands as trustee for the real sovereign, the people."); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
NaturalResource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484 (1970) ("[C]ertain
interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the
society as one of citizens rather than of serfs.").
128 See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 124, at 694 n. 137 ("[T]he rise of the public trust cannot
be separated from the demise of the crown and thus the need to divide up the various powers that
the crown possessed. . . . [L]awmakers in America necessarily had to decide what the king owned
personally and what property he held in a sovereign capacity (since the king's counselors largely
used the term property to cover everything).... In England, the general practice was the navigable
waterways were owned by the king in a sovereign capacity (though the term was not used) which
meant, critically, that the public had rights to fish.. .. If the king had owned the waterways in a
proprietary capacity, then the public would not have had rights to fish." (quoting E-mail from
Eric Freyfogle, Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law to Michael C.
Blumm, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School (Oct. 12, 2005))).
129 Dale D. Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture,
The Public Trust, and Propertyin
Land, 35 ENvrL. L. 807, 839 n.162 (2005) (citations omitted).
13

Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.

322 (1979).
1'

Id. at 522.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss1/3

14

Arthur: Following Game Trails: Identifying the Right Path to Restitution

2017

FOLLOWING GAME TRAILS

131

to confine game within its borders stemmed from the State's "ownership ... in its
sovereign capacity." 132 As part of the State's sovereign ownership, the State could
declare its wildlife inalienable. 3 3 Accordingly, the Court found that the statute
did not violate the Commerce Clause because game was not "the subject-matter
of interstate commerce. 13 4
While Geer "confirmed state sovereign ownership of wildlife," states used
Geer to maintain that they "actually owned" the wildlife within their borders."'
However, the Supreme Court later "eroded that proposition."'3 In Missouri v.
Holland, the Court entertained Missouri's challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act ("MBTA").1 3 7The MBTA was enacted subsequent to a 1916 treaty with Great
Britain to protect birds that migrated across North America. 3 3 The State argued
that the MBTA, and regulations on bird hunting promulgated pursuant thereto,
violated the Tenth Amendment.' 3 9 Missouri predicated its argument upon notions
of state sovereign ownership including a pecuniary interest in birds. 40 Finding
that the states are subordinate to laws enacted under valid treaties, the Court
began assaulting Geer's ownership rationale by noting that "[t]o put the claim of
the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed.""'
Id. at 529. This authority was described as "common ownership" of wildlife by the State's
citizens. Id. The Court opined that the people's common ownership of wildlife mandated that
the State act "as a trust for the benefit of the people." Id. Further, the Court explained "that the
ownership of the sovereign authority is in trust for all the people of the [S]rate; [thus,] it is the
[legislature's] duty . .. to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its
beneficial use in the future to the people of the [S]tate." Id. at 534 (quoting Magner v. People, 97
Ill. 320, 334 (Ill. 1881)).
3 Geer, 161 U.S. at 530 ("The common ownership imports the right to keep the property, if
132

the sovereign so chooses, always within its jurisdiction for every purpose.").
13

Id. at 530.

'35 David Willms & Anne Alexander, The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation

in Wyoming: Understanding it, Preserving it, and Funding its Future, 14 Wyo. L. REv. 659,

666-67 (2014).
136

Id.

137 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-31 (1920).
138 Id. at 431 ("[The treaty] recited that many species of birds in their annual migrations
traversed certain parts of the United States and of Canada, that they were of great value as a source of
food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through
lack of adequate protection.").

Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 434 ("The State as we have intimated, founds its claim of exclusive authority upon
an assertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute."); id. at 431 ("The
State also alleges a pecuniary interest, as owner of the wild birds within its borders and otherwise,
admitted by the Government to be sufficient, but it is enough that the bill is a reasonable and proper
means to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a State.").
139

140

1' Id. at 434-35. "No doubt it is true that, as between a State and its inhabitants, the State
may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive
of paramount powers." Id at 434. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 332 (1979), the Court
noted that this language was a comment on Geer's rationale.
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Nearly thirty years later, the Supreme Court expressly dispelled Geer's
ownership rationale.1 42 In Toomer v. Witsell, fishermen from Georgia argued that
South Carolina's regulations violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by
treating citizens of South Carolina different than citizens of other states.143 The
South Carolina officials made a number of arguments centered on the State's
sovereign ownership of the shrimp in its waters.14 In ruling that the laws were
unconstitutional, the Court explained that "[t] he whole ownership theory, in fact,
is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the
importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource."14 5
After Toomer, the Court embraced the new understanding of state sovereign
ownership. 14 6 In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., Seacoast Products argued,
inter alia, that Virginia laws restricting the ability of nonresidents to catch fish in
the Commonwealth's waters were preempted by a federal licensing statute.4 7
Virginia argued that as the "owners" of the fish, pursuant to the Submerged
Lands Act, it could "exclude federal licensees."'"4 The Court found this argument
unpersuasive, and reiterated Toomer's "legal fiction" rationale. 4 9 Further, the
Court explained that
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a
private game preserve, and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning'
wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal
Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has
title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by
skillful capture.'10
142

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).

143

Id. at 387-91.

144 Id. at 399-400 (arguing, inter alia, "that fish and game are the common property of
all citizens of the governmental unit and that the government, as a sort of trustee, exercises this
'ownership' for the benefit of its citizens. In the case of fish, it has also been considered that each
government 'owned' both the beds of its lakes, streams, and tidewaters and the waters themselves;
hence it must also 'own' the fish within those waters").
145

Id. at 402-03.

146

Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).

147

Id. at 267, 271.

14s

Id. at 283.

Id. at 284 ('"[O]wnership' language of cases such as those cited by appellant must be
understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing 'the importance to its people
that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."' (quoting
149

Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402)).
"o Id. (citing Missouri v. Holland, 334 U.S. 385, 434 (1948); Geer v Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519, 539-40 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting)). Douglasmade clear that title to living wildlife was not
held by the states or the federal government. In so doing, Douglasheld true to the principles which
catalyzed the shift from "royal prerogative" to state sovereign ownership: the people, not the states
or federal government, hold a proprietary interest in living wildlife.
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After weakening Geer's ownership rationale, the Court overturned it in
Hughes v. Oklahoma."' The Hughes Court found that an Oklahoma law that
restricted the interstate transportation of wildlife violated the Commerce
Clause. 5 2 Further, to the extent that Geer can be read as affirming that states hold
title to wildlife, Hughes abandoned it.1' In so doing, the Court, again, explained
that state sovereign ownership of wildlife as an antiquated "legal fiction expressing
'the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource."" 54

The Supreme Court has consistently articulated that state sovereign ownership
merely describes the state's authority to regulate, and an interest in protecting,
wildlife on the people's behalf.' Sovereign ownership is not a proprietary interest
in wildlife. 5'
The two concepts outlined above represent different trails that circuits have
followed when ordering restitution for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. First,
in Cleveland and Pasquantinothe Court distinguished between a regulatory and
economic interest and explained that an economic loss is a loss of potential and
actual property interest. Second, regarding state sovereign ownership, the Court
articulated that state sovereign ownership of wildlife is a legal shorthand for a
state's interest in protecting wildlife on its citizens' behalf. Importantly, sovereign
ownership of wildlife is not a proprietary interest in the wildlife.

51
152

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 323-36.

153 Id. at 334-36. Although Hughes clarified that the states
did not own wildlife, the decision
did not disturb the principle in Geer that the states act as trustees of the wildlife for the benefit of
the citizens. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildhfe, 35 ENvTL. L. 673, 707 n.224 (2005)
(highlighting numerous scholarly works arguing this point) (citations omitted).
114 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335 (quoting Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)). However,
in a recent decision, Horne v. DepartmentofAgriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), the Supreme Court
discussed a pre-Toomer case from the Maryland Court of Appeals which referenced Maryland's
sovereign ownership of oysters in its waters. Id. at 2431 (citing Leonard v. Earle, 141 A. 714,
716-17 (1928)).
15
E.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335 (citations omitted); Douglas, 431 U.S. at 284; Toomer, 334

U.S. at 402; see, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978)
(Burger, CJ, concurring) ("A State does not 'own' wild birds and animals in the same way that it
may own other natural resources such as land, oil, or timber. But . . . the doctrine is not completely
obsolete. It manifests the State's special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit
of its citizens. . . . Whether we describe this interest as proprietary or otherwise is not significant."
(citations omitted)); see also Holland, 334 U.S. at 434 ("To put the claim of the State upon title is
to lean upon a slender reed.").
156 Douglas, 431 U.S. at 284; see also Deborah G. Musiker,
Tom France & Lisa A. Hallenbeck,
The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines:Protecting Wildlfe in Uncertain PoliticalTimes, 16
PuB. LAND L. REv. 87, 106 (1995) ("[T]he state's sovereign ownership of its wildlife is not a
proprietary form of ownership.").
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V.

RESTITUTION FOR CONSPIRACY

To VIOLATE THE

LACEY ACT

Circuits generally agree that states are the victims of conspiracies to violate the
Lacey Act.' 5 7 Yet, circuits split regarding why states are entitled to victims' status
for this crime and, thus, restitution. Following one trail, the Second and Fourth
Circuits relied on Pasquantino'srevenue-based rationale to grant restitution for
Lacey Act conspiracies.'1 5 Following another trail, the Tenth Circuit, and likely
the Sixth Circuit, equated sovereign ownership with proprietary ownership and
ordered conspirators to pay restitution to the States for damaging state property,
the wildlife.'" Federal courts ordering restitution for conspiracy to violate the
Lacey Act should follow the trail blazed by the Second and Fourth Circuits
because it comports with Supreme Court precedent, settled notions of state
sovereign ownership, and judicial efficiency. Section A discusses decisions of the
Second and Fourth Circuits that granted restitution for damage to an interest
other than a proprietary interest in living wildlife. Section B discusses decisions of
the Tenth and Sixth Circuits that treated state sovereign ownership of wildlife as
a proprietary interest in wildlife.

A. Restitutionfor Damage to Interests Other Than ProprietaryInterest in
Living WiIdife
Adopting Pasquantino's revenue-based rationale, the Second and Fourth
Circuits determined that a foreign nation and two states, respectively, obtained
a proprietary interest in wildlife sufficient to trigger MVRA restitution only
after the wildlife had been poached.' 60 The Fourth Circuit also recognized that
the States held a non-property interest in protecting live wildlife which entitled
the States to VWPA restitution when the protection interest was harmed by a
conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act.'
1.

United States v. Bengis: Defining the Interest ofa Nation

In United States v. Bengis, the Second Circuit was faced with whether the
62
nation of South Africa had a property interest in poached lobster.1 Defendant,

United States v. Oceanpro Industries Ltd., 674 E3d 323, 331 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Butler, 694 E3d 1177, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bruce, 437 E App'x
1

357, 367 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bengis, 631 E3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2011).
Bengis, 631 E3d at 39-42; see Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331-32 (adopting Bengis' rationale
(citing Bengis, 631 E3d at 39-42)).
'M

"9 Bruce, 437 E App'x at 367; Butler, 694 E3d at 1183-84.
160

Bengis, 631 E3d at 39-41; see Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331-32 (citing Bengis, 631 F.3d at

39-41).
161 Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 330-31.
162

Bengis, 631 E3d at 38.
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Arnold Bengis, was the managing director of a South Africa based fishing and
processing company through which he harvested rock lobsters in violation of
South African law. 6 Bengis and his co-defendants were caught and eventually
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. 164
At sentencing, the Government moved for restitution under the VWPA and
the MVRA; however, the district court denied both motions. 1" The court's order
turned on its decision to follow Cleveland over Pasquantino: the district court
determined that, like Cleveland, the defendants' fishing violations ran afoul of
a purely regulatory interest of South Africa.' 6 6 Therefore, there was no offense
against property to trigger the MVRA.' 6 7 Further, the district court denied VWPA
restitution, determining that South Africa was not a victim under that statute.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.' 6 ' Regarding the MVRA, the court
7
found that Pasquantino, not Cleveland, controlled.o
Under South African law,
illegally harvested lobsters were property of South Africa.' 7 1 "[T] he South African
government [was] authorized to seize illegally harvested lobsters, sell them, and
retain the proceeds" of the sale.1 72 The court reasoned that since the defendants
harvested lobsters in violation of South African law, "the moment a fisherman
pull [ed] an illegally harvested lobster out of the sea, a property right to seize that
lobster ... vested in the government of South Africa." 7 Depriving South Africa
of the right to seize and sell the poached lobster essentially deprived the nation
of revenue (the proceeds of the sale) to which it was lawfully entitled. 7 1 Under
Pasquantino,being lawfully entitled to revenue is a right to property in the form of
7
money."'
Thus, by depriving South Africa of its revenue, the defendants' actions
constituted crime against property.' 7 6 Accordingly, the Bengis court determined
that South Africa had a sufficient interest in the poached lobster to warrant
MVRA restitution. 7 7
163

Id. at 35.

166

Id. at 35-36.
Id at 37.
Id.

167

Id

168

Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.

16
65

161

o Id at 39-40.
"1 Id. at 39.
172

Id

173

Id

174

Id
Id. (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355-56 (2005)).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40-4 1.

175
176
177
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With respect to the MVRAs pecuniary loss requirement, the Bengis court
mentioned it in the statement of the law but did not address it directly in the
opinion.17 1 However, given the court's finding that the property lost by South
Africa was money, in the form of uncollected revenue, addressing the pecuniary
loss requirement was unnecessary because the property and pecuniary loss were
one and the same."'
While the Second Circuit ultimately ruled in the Government's favor, the
court did not accept all of the Government's arguments. Of note, the Government
argued that South Africa was entitled to MVRA restitution because it had a
proprietary interest in the living lobsters.` 0 According to the Government, South
Africa was the trustee of the lobsters on behalf of its citizens, and that publictrust relationship included an ownership interest in the wild crustaceans.' The
Second Circuit declined to grant restitution to South Africa for the loss of living
lobsters 182 which decision comported to principles of sovereign ownership of
18 3
wildlife-namely, the state does not hold a proprietary interest in living wildlife.
In addition to finding that South Africa was a victim under the MVRA, the
Bengis court also determined that South Africa was a victim under the VWPA."'
However, the court declined to grant restitution pursuant to the VWPA, reasoning
"the MVRA govern[ed] the restitution award at issue."'
Bengis determined that Pasquantino,rather than Cleveland controlled cases in
which a foreign nation was deprived of its right to seize and sell poached wildlife.
The court found that the revenue South Africa would have received from the sale
of the wildlife was property lost as a result of the conspiracy. Further, Bengis found
that a foreign nation could be a victim for the purposes of the MVRA and the
VWPA when wildlife within its borders was poached.

78
1'

Id at 38-39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(c)(1)(B)(2012)).

Id. at 40.

Iso Brief for Appellant at 31, UnitedStates v. Bengis, 631 E3d 33 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 07-4895cr) [hereinafter Government's Bengis Br.].
181
182

Id. at 41-42.
Bengis, 631 F.3d at 39-41.

183 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
1"
Bengis, 631 F.3d at 40-41. The court found that South Africa was "directly harmed" by
the defendants' conspiracy so as to render the nation a victim under the MVRA and the VWPA

because the defendants "facilitated the illegal harvesting of the lobsters by providing access to the
United States market and enabled the poaching to go undetected by the South African government."
Id. at 41.
"I Id. at 41.
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United States v. Oceanpro Industries Ltd.: Defining the Interest of

the States
In United States v. Oceanpro Industries Ltd., the Fourth Circuit had to determine whether Maryland and Virginia held sufficient interest in poached striped
bass to make the States victims of the defendants' conspiracy to violate the
Lacey Act.' Oceanpro Industries, Ltd. (hereinafter, "Oceanpro") was a seafood
wholesaler in Washington, D.C. that was convicted of conspiracy to violate the
Lacey Act for purchasing illegally-harvested fish.'87 The district court ordered
Oceanpro, as well as two individual defendants, to pay restitution in the amount
of $300,000 to Maryland and Virginia under the MVRA and the VWPA.'" The
defendants appealed the district court's orders of restitution. 1
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Maryland and Virginia
had sufficient interest in the fish to be victims and were entitled to restitution
under the MVRA and the VWPA.' 9 o Regarding the MVRA, the Oceanpro court
based its decision primarily on Bengis."' The court reasoned that "[j]ust as South
African law authorized the seizure and sale of the illegally harvested lobsters,
Maryland and Virginia law authorize[d] the States' seizure and sale of illegally
harvested striped bass."' 92 Accordingly, the court determined that Maryland and
Virginia had acquired a property interest in fish after they were poached, which
entitled the States to MVRA restitution. 9 3
The Government unsuccessfully argued that Maryland and Virginia were
entitled to restitution under the MVRA because, pursuant to the Submerged
Lands Act,' 94 they held lawful title to the fish.' 1 As titleholders, the Government
"' United States v. Oceanpro Indust. Ltd., 674 E3d 323, 326 (4th Cir. 2012).
17

Id. at 326-27.

188 Id. at 327, 330. The court also addressed restitution ordered pursuant to other statutes but
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
189

Id. at 330.

"o Id. at 331-32.

19 Id.; The court also cited by analogy to United States v. Newsome, 322 E3d 328,
340-42 (4th Cir. 2004) in which the court found "the federal government to be a victim under
the MVRA and ordered restitution for illegally harvested black cherry trees in a national forest."
Id. at 332.
192 Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
193 Id. Like Bengis, Oceanpro did not address the MVRAs pecuniary loss requirement,
likely
because the property lost by the states was money in the form of uncollected revenue. See id.
(reasoning that Bengis and Oceanpro both "involved the illegal catch of fish (lobsters in Bengis and
striped bass here), which became subject to seizure and sale by the state"); see supra notes 178-179
and accompanying text.

194

43 U.S.C.

§ 1311 (2012).

'9' Answering Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 31-32, United States v. Oceanpro Industries
Ltd., 674 E3d 323 (4th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-5239, 10-5284, 10-5285) (citing United States
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contended, the states held a proprietary interest in the living fish; therefore,
poaching the fish damaged the States' property for which the States were entitled
to restitution under the MVRA. 9 6 Like Bengis, Oceanpro rejected this argument;
however, Oceanpro did so expressly, opining that "the States were entitled to
restitution, not based on the States' interests in the free swimming fish in their
waters, but based on their proprietary interest in illegally caught fish obtained
through the States' forfeiture laws."197 By rejecting the Government's argument,
Oceanpro conformed to principles of state sovereign ownership of wildlife."
The Oceanpro court also awarded VWPA restitution to Maryland and
Virginia.' 99 Oceanpro reasoned that, although the States lacked a proprietary
interest in the live fish, "they surely did possess a legitimate and substantial
interest in protecting the fish in their waters as part of the natural resources of
the State and its fishing industries."2 00 The defendants "undoubtedly directly and
proximately harmed" the States' interest by poaching the fish.20 ' Accordingly, the
Oceanpro court held that restitution "was proper under any of the restitution
provisions advanced [including] the MVRA [and] the V\WPA." 202
Oceanprodescribed the States' interest in living wildlife in terms of protection,
not proprietaryownership.2 03 This protection-based interest in live fish comports
with the historical concepts of sovereign ownership of wildlife. 204 As discussed
above, sovereign ownership does not bestow upon states a property interest in
wildlife;205 rather, it allows states to regulate wildlife for the benefit of the people. 0

v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2011)) [hereinafter Government's Oceanpro Br.]. As part
of this unsuccessful argument, the Government explained that the Submerged Lands Act (which
vests in a state, title to natural resources found in state waters), reflects common law principles of
sovereign ownership. See id. at 30 (noting that courts have long held that states own lands under
their waters and wildlife in residing within boundaries).
196

Id. at 31-32.

'9 Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331. The court also noted, "[t]o qualify as victims, Maryland and
Virginia need not even have been 'owners' of the striped bass, although they were after the fish were
illegally caught." Id. at 332.
198 See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.

199 Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331-32.
200 Id. at 331. The court noted that Maryland asserted in its amicus brief, that it was a victim
under the VWPA "by virtue of the harm to its interests as trustee of the striped bass within its
waters." Id. at 330 (emphasis in original).

201 Id. at 331

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (citing United States v.

Gibbens, 25 E3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1994)).
202

Id. at 332.

203

Id.

204

See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.

205

Id.

206

Id.
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The Fourth Circuit adhered to these principles by rejecting the Government's
position that the States owned living fish and articulating a non-ownership,
protection-based interest that the States had in the live fish.
'When ordering MVRA restitution for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act,
courts should adopt the seize-and-sale rationale outlined in Bengis and Oceanpro.
The Bengis and Oceanpro line is grounded squarely in Pasquantino's revenuebased reasoning. Following Bengis and Oceanpro is judicially efficient because
it simultaneously meets both the property damage and pecuniary loss elements
of the MVRA. 207 Moreover, courts should follow Oceanproand order restitution
for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act under the VWPA for harm to the states'
interest in protecting wildlife within their borders. Bengis and Oceanpro's rulings
also conform to longstanding notions of state sovereign ownership by not
conferring a proprietary interest in living wildlife onto the states.

B. Restitution Based on ProprietaryInterest in Living Wildlife
Unlike the Second and Fourth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit upheld an order of
MVRA restitution for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act because it found that
the State's sovereign ownership of wildlife was a proprietary interest in the living
wildlife. Accordingly, the court had to establish that harm to the State's wildlife
constituted a pecuniary loss to the state in order to meet the requirements of the
MVRA. Additionally, while its rationale is less clear, the Sixth Circuit likely also
found that the State had a proprietary interest in live wildlife.
1.

United States v. Butler: Resurrectingthe Royal Prerogative

In United States v. Butler, the Tenth Circuit had to determine whether
Kansas was a victim of defendant's Lacey Act conspiracy.208 Brothers James and
Marlin Butler were professional hunting guides who took people on expeditions
for deer.2 09 On several occasions, the Butlers "encourage[d] their clients to hunt
without a valid license, use illegal equipment, shoot more bucks than authorized,
and fail to tag carcasses" in violation of the hunting laws of Kansas.2 10 The Butlers
pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the Lacey Act.21 ' At sentencing, the district
court ordered the Butlers to pay $25,000 in restitution to Kansas, through its

207

18 U.S.C.

§ 3663A(c)(1) (requiring the victim to suffer property damage and a

pecuniary loss).
208 United States v. Butler, 694 E3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 2012).
209

Id. at 1178.

210

Id. at 1179.

211

Id
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wildlife agency, under the IVRA.212 James Butler appealed the district court's
restitution order.2 13
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 2 14 The court determined that
conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act constituted a crime against property under the
MVRA. 215 The court reasoned that a state owned the wildlife within its borders in
its sovereign capacity.2 1 6Therefore, "committing harm against the wildlife in a state
is tantamount to committing harm against that state's property for the purposes
of the MVRA." 2 17 The court concluded that "[b]ecause wildlife is property of the
state, and the state can be a victim under the MVRA, it follows that the district
court properly designated Kansas as the victim of [the defendants'] poaching." 218
Butler cited Bengis in support of its finding that "conspiracies to violate the
Lacey Act qualify as offenses against property for the purposes of the MVRA." 2 19
However, Butler disregarded Bengis' seize-and-sell rationale and instead found
that sovereign ownership gave Kansas a sufficient interest in wildlife for MVRA
restitution. 220 This determination was antithetical to the concept of sovereign
ownership of wildlife, which is not a proprietary interest.221 As discussed above,
the Supreme Court has noted that a state "does not stand in the same position as
the owner of a private game preserve, and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild

Id. at 1179-80. The VWPA was not at issue in Butler.
213 Id. at 1180, 1183. Defendants also argued that they committed
a victimless crime and that
restitution should not be paid to the state. Id. at 1184; Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum at
15, United States v. Butler, 2011 WL 2516921 (D. Kan. June 23, 2011) (No. 10-10089-01-WEB).
The defendants successfully challenged the district court's valuation of the deer for the purposes
of a sentencing enhancement; however, this is beyond the scope of this Article. Butler, 694 E3d at
1180-83.
212

Butler, 694 E3d at 1183-85.
Id. at 1183 (citing United States v. Bruce, 437 F. App'x 357, 366-67 (6th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Bengis, 631 E3d 33, 38-41 (2d Cir. 2011).
216 Id. (citing N.M. State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 E2d
1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 1969)).
The Butler court mused that "[i]t would be interesting to engage in the centuries-old inquiry into
whether the taking of wildlife can best be regulated under the common law theories of res nullius,
res communis, or res publica. But we will leave such philosophical debate to the academy and resort
to the established precedent of our constituent states in the circuit." Id. at 1183 n.3.
214

215

217 Id at 1183-84.
218

Idatl184.

Id at 1183 (citing Bengis, 631 F.3d at 38-41).
220 Id. at 1183-84. The court could have adopted Bengis' seize-and-sell
rationale since Kansas
had the authority to seize-and-sell the unlawfully-taken deer. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1047(a)
(2) (2016) (empowering Kansas to seize and sell "any wildlife which is taken, possessed, sold or
transported unlawfully").
219

221

See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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fish, birds, or animals." 2 22 In fact, no state, "any more than a hopeful fisherman
or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by
skillful capture." 223 Sovereign ownership merely describes a State's authority and
responsibility to preserve wildlife on behalf of its citizens.224 As Kansas lacked a
property interest in the living wildlife, the MVRA did not authorize the court to
order the defendants to pay restitution.
More fundamentally, equating state sovereign ownership of wildlife with
proprietary ownership of wildlife essentially alters the relationship between
the states and the citizens. We the People, not the state governments, are the
true sovereigns of the United States and are thus the true owners of the wildlife
therein. 22 5 State sovereign ownership accounts for this distinction by describing
the state's interest in wildlife as an interest in regulating wildlife on the
people's behalf 226 Federal courts must not bestow onto states the royal prerogative
once held by English monarchs by merging sovereign and proprietary ownership
of wildlife.
That is not to say that Butler's sovereign ownership reasoning was entirely
unprecedented. Indeed, Butler's MVRA reasoning seems similar to Oceanpro's
VWPA reasoning. 22 7 In both cases, the courts recognized the States' interests
in protecting wildlife, 228 determined that the States' interests were harmed

222

Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (citations omitted).

223

Id. (citations omitted).

224 See supra notes 155 and accompanying text.
225

Cf DALE D. GOBLE & Esic T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, CASE AND MATERIALS 294 (2002)

("[T]he doctrine of royal prerogative ownership of submerged lands thus was transformed in the
transition from monarchy to republic into the doctrine of state sovereign ownership in which the
state held the lands as trustee for the real sovereign, the people."); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective judicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484 (1970)
(" [C]ertain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their free availability tends to
mark the society as one of citizens rather than of serfs.").
226 See supra notes 112, 156 and accompanying text.
227 As noted above, "sovereign ownership" is legal shorthand to describe "the State's special
interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citizens." Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978) (Burger, CJ, concurring); see Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979); Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977); Toomer v.

Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
228 The similarity becomes clearer if the term "sovereign ownership" in Butler is replaced
with the Supreme Court's definition of sovereign ownership. Compare Butler, 694 E3d at 1183
("In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the fact that the several states [have a 'special interest in
regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citizens']." (bracketed language quoting
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 392 (Burger, CJ, concurring))), with United States v. Oceanpro Indust. Ltd.,

674 E3d 323, 331 (4th Cit. 2012) ("[S]urely [the States] did possess a legitimate and substantial
interest in protecting the fish in their waters as part of the natural resources of the State and its
fishing industries.").
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by unlawful taking of wildlife, 22 9 and awarded restitution to the States for the
harm to their interests. 230 The obvious distinction between these cases is that
the MVRA required Butler to find that the State had a proprietary interest in
the living wildlife, while the VWPA did not require Oceanpro to make such a
finding. Butler's reasoning, although sound if applied to VWPA restitution, was
inappropriately applied to award restitution under the MVRA.
Moreover, establishing that Kansas had a proprietary interest in the property
(the deer) that was damaged by the defendants' conspiracy was insufficient for
mandatory restitution since the MVRA also requires the victim to have suffered
pecuniary loss. 2 3' The court seems to have addressed this point by explaining
that the loss suffered by Kansas stemmed from the defendants' failure to
properly tag their query, which "prevent[ed] Kansas from accurately managing
its deer population and [could have led] to overharvesting." 23 2 Without further
explanation, the Butler court determined that the district court did not commit
clear error by finding this to be a "cognizable injury [which] constituted a
pecuniary loss to Kansas." 233
Here too, Butler's deficiencies are highlighted through a comparison to the
Bengis/Oceanproline of cases. Bengis and Oceanpro found that the foreign nation
and States, respectively, were entitled to revenue lost as a result of the defendants'
conspiracies, 2 34 and thus pecuniary loss was inherent in the decisions. 235 Butler was
not grounded in a revenue-based rationale, so it had to meet the second element
of the MVRA by highlighting the potential for inaccurate wildlife management
and overharvesting of wildlife. While one can imagine a number of ways in

229

Compare United States v. Butler, 694 E3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cit. 2012) ("We further

hold that the district court properly concluded that Kansas suffered a loss. The PSR and evidence
submitted by the government indicated that deer were not tagged immediately or not tagged at
all during James' guided hunts. Such failures prevent Kansas from accurately managing its deer
population and can lead to overharvesting. In concluding that this was a cognizable injury and
constituted pecuniary loss to Kansas, the district court did not commit clear error."), with Oceanpro,
674 E3d at 331 ("[T]he States' interests in protecting the fish were undoubtedly 'directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the illegal harvesting of the striped bass." (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted)).
230 Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331-32; Butler, 694
F.3d at 1184-85.
231 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B) (2012). But see Melanie Pierson
& Meghan N. Dilges,
Restitution in Wildlife Cases, 63 U.S Attorneys' Bull., no. 3, May 2015, at 82, 86 (describing the
Butler court's finding, that Kansas suffered a cognizable injury and a pecuniary loss, as an alternative
basis for granting MVRA restitution).
232 Butler, 694 E3d at 1184.

233

I.

234

Oceanpro, 674 E3d at 331-32; United States v. Bengis, 631 E3d 33, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2011).
See supra notes 179, 200 and accompanying text.

235
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which inaccurate management and potential overharvesting can cost the state
money, none were articulated by the court. Thus, this appears to be a rougher trail
to follow.
By predicating MVRA restitution on sovereign ownership, Butler created a
6
trail distinct from Bengis and Oceanpro." Butler should not be followed because
it contravenes the concept of state sovereign ownership of wildlife as outlined
by the Supreme Court, by equating sovereign ownership with proprietary
ownership. Adhering to Butler's reasoning would also require a court to take the
additional step of defining the state's pecuniary loss, so as to entitle the state to
MVRA restitution.
2.

United States v. Bruce: Muddy- Water Restitution

In United States v. Bruce, the court was faced with whether Alabama and
237
The
Tennessee constituted victims for the purposes of MVRA restitution.
defendants were convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, conspiracy to violate the
Lacey Act for buying and selling undersized mussels, illegally harvested from the
2 38
The defendants were sentenced to prison
waters of Alabama and Tennessee.
2 39
and ordered to pay $50,000 in restitution to the States through their respective
24 0
wildlife agencies. One of the defendants, William Salyers, challenged the district
24
court's restitution order. 1
2 42
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's order of restitution, holding
243
that the States could be victims under the MVRA. Further, the court reasoned
the
that the States, through their agencies, were entitled to restitution because
24 4
"[The
waters.
States'
the
from
taken
undersized mussels were unlawfully
mussels] were not the property of the possessors, but rather the [S]tates from
whose waters they were taken. Thus, the [S]tates have a property interest in the
245
mussel shells and are entitled to compensation for their loss."

236

But see Peirson & Dilges, supra note 232, at 86 (describing Butler as part of the Bengis/

Oceanpro line of precedent).
237 United States v. Bruce, 437 F. App'x 357, 366-67 (6th Cir. 2011). The VWPA was not at
issue in Bruce.
238 Id. at 359-60. Bruce and Pamela Salyers were convicted at trial and William Salyers
subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts. Id. at 360.
239

Id. at 360.

240

Id. at 366-67.
Id. at 366.

241

243

Id. at 368.
Id. at 367.

244

Id.

245

Id.

242
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The decision in Bruce can be interpreted in two ways. First, Bruce can be read
as the court finding that Alabama and Tennessee were entitled to restitution based
on their ownership of the living mussels. Under this interpretation, the Bruce
court held that the States had proprietary interests in the mussels within their
borders.2 46 The defendants' conspiracy damaged the mussels, and the States were
entitled to restitution for damage to state property.2 4 7 The plain language of Bruce
supports this interpretation. Accordingly, property-based restitution for damage
to live wildlife is the best interpretation of Bruce. This reading puts Bruce in line
with Butler.
An alternative reading of Bruce places it in the BengislOceanproline of cases.
Under this interpretation, the court based its decision not on wildlife as state
property but on the States' lost revenue from their right to seize and sell the
poached mussels. Once the mussels were illegally taken from state waters "[t]hey
were not the property of the possessors, but the [S]tates from whose waters they
were taken."2 48 In other words, the proprietary interest in the illegally poached
mussels vested in the States once the mussels were removed from the water.
As Alabama and Tennessee held a proprietary interest in the illegally removed
mussels, the States were entitled to restitution for the revenue they would have
gained from seizing and selling the mussels. Further, Bruce does not address the
MVRA's pecuniary loss requirement which would have been unnecessary if the
court was granting restitution for lost revenue.
However, two missing elements from Bruce make this "seize-and-sell"
interpretation implausible. First, despite having very similar facts to, and (under
this reading) using the same rationale as, Bengis, the Bruce court did not cite to
Bengis as authority.2 49 Omitting any citation to Bengis points to the Sixth Circuit
not relying on Bengis' rationale. Second, if the Bruce court had ordered restitution
based on lost revenue from the inability to seize and sell the illegally harvested
mussels, one would expect the court to have mentioned "seizure and sale" in the
opinion, but it did not. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Bruce court was
awarding Alabama and Tennessee restitution for their interests in the revenue they
would have gained from the seizure and sale of the poached mussels.
Bruce and Butler diverge from the BengislOceanproline of cases. Butler clearly
identified state sovereign ownership of wildlife as sufficient interest in live wildlife
to warrant MVRA restitution. It thereby deemed sovereign ownership to be
proprietary ownership. It also identified the harm to state management of wildlife
(the potential for overharvesting of deer) as a pecuniary injury. Bruce offered less

246
247
248
249

Id
Id
Id.
Bengis was decided four months before Bruce.
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in the way of reasoning and authority, making it more difficult to categorize.
Given that Bruce did not mention seizure and sale, nor did it cite to Bengis, Bruce
likely falls in line with Buter, basing MVRA restitution on the States' proprietary

ownership of living wildlife.
VI. CONCLUSION
Circuits agree that states can be victims of conspiracies to violate the Lacey
Act. However, in these cases, Circuits are split regarding the state's interest in
wildlife that entitles the state to victim's status. In other words, as Roosevelt
might have said, courts have arrived at the same water source, but they followed
different game trails to get there. Oceanpro, adopting the reasoning of Bengis,
held that the States' right to seize and sell the poached wildlife was an economic
harm which entitled the States to restitution for their lost revenue. District
courts should follow Bengis and Oceanpro because this line of cases is grounded
in Supreme Court precedent, comports with the concept of sovereign ownership,
and adheres to principles of judicial efficiency by clearly satisfying the MVRA's
pecuniary loss requirement. Additionally, courts should follow Oceanpro and
award VWPA restitution to states for harm to the state interest in protecting
wildlife. Buter, and, in all likelihood, Bruce, based MVRA restitution on a finding
that the States' sovereign ownership of wildlife was proprietary. This reasoning
is not founded on Supreme Court authority, contravenes the long held concept
of sovereign ownership in wildlife, and requires an extra step to establish the
MVRA's pecuniary loss requirement.
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